If a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory individual best response improvement path, ends at a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. If a game is weakly dominance solvable, then every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path and with an individual best response path (if there are more than two players, switches from one best response to another may be needed). Both statements remain valid if dominance solvability in the usual sense is replaced with "BR-dominance solvability," where a strategy can be eliminated if it is not among the best responses to anything, or if it is not indispensable for providing the best responses to all contingencies. For a two person game, some implications in the opposite direction are obtained.
Introduction
demonstrated connections between dominance solvability and nice behavior of best response dynamics, although he worked in a rather narrow context. Here we strive to produce a complete picture of "what depends on what." For technical convenience, we only consider finite games, where we can essentially restrict ourselves to finite improvement (or adjustment) paths; in a continuous game, this would be insufficient. Similarly, iterative elimination of dominated strategies in an infinite game raises quite a few complicated questions (Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002) ; in particular, very much depends on topological assumptions.
An apparently new notion of BR-dominance solvability is introduced; to be more precise, two versions of the notion. We assume that a strategy can be eliminated if it is not among the best responses to any profile of strategies of the partners/rivals, or if it is not indispensable for providing the best responses to all contingencies. This novelty allows us to formulate the weakest conditions for nice behavior of both sequential and simultaneous tâtonnement processes based on dominance solvability; in particular, weak dominance solvability has the same implications as the strict one if all best responses are unique. It also makes possible implications in the opposite direction and even equivalence results. One result of the type was obtained by Moulin (1984, Corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2), but, again, in a very special case.
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite set of players N , and strategy sets X i and preference relations on X N = i∈N X i for all i ∈ N . We always assume that each X i is finite and preferences are described with ordinal utility functions u i : X N → R. For each i ∈ N , we denote X −i = j∈N \{i} X j and R i (x −i ) = Argmax
for every x −i ∈ X −i (the best response correspondence); if #N = 2, then −i denotes the partner/rival of player i.
Improvement paths
Given a strategic game Γ, we introduce the individual improvement relation Ind and best response improvement relation BR on X N (i ∈ N , y N , x N ∈ X N ):
By definition, a strategy profile x N ∈ X N is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x N is a maximizer of Ind , i.e., if y N Ind x N is impossible for any y N ∈ X N . In a finite game, x N ∈ X N is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x N is a maximizer of is defined. As in Kukushkin et al. (2005) , we combine the terminology of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , Milchtaich (1996) , and Friedman and Mezzetti (2001) . A game has the finite improvement property (FIP ) if it admits no infinite improvement path. A game has the finite best response improvement property (FBRP ) if it admits no infinite best response improvement path. The FIP (FBRP) implies that every (best response) improvement path reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. A game has the weak FIP (weak FBRP ) if, for every x N ∈ X N , there exists a finite (best response) improvement path 
. A game has the finite inclusive best response improvement property (FIBRP ) if it admits no infinite inclusive Cournot path. It is immediately clear that the FIBRP implies, in particular, the convergence of the sequential tatonnement process as defined by Moulin (1984, p. 87 ) in a finite number of steps.
A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation; with every preorder , its asymmetric component and an equivalence relation ∼ are naturally associated. A Cournot quasipotential is a preorder on X N such that for every x N ∈ X N there exists a subset
If is a Cournot potential, then its reflexive closure is a Cournot quasipotential with M (x N ) = ∅ for all x N ∈ X N . If is a Cournot quasipotential, then we may extend its asymmetric component in this way: 
Since all x N ∈ Y can be arranged into a single Cournot cycle and that cycle cannot be complete,
belongs to a non-singleton equivalence class Y , and M (x N ) = ∅ otherwise. The conditions (1) are checked easily.
Finally, let be a Cournot quasipotential and x k N k∈N be an infinite Cournot path; we have to show that the path is not inclusive. Since X N is finite, at least one strategy profilē x N must enter into the path an infinite number of times. Let x m N =x N for the first time; clearly, we must have
Remark. In the proof of Theorem 3 of Kukushkin (2004) , the FBRP was derived from the presence of a "quasipotential" in an even weaker sense than (1). The point is that whenever a game satisfies the conditions of that theorem, so do all its reduced games. Generally, we only obtain FIBRP. In particular, dominance solvability (in any sense) need not be inherited by the reduced games, hence Theorem 4.3 below also asserts only FIBRP.
We introduce the simultaneous best response adjustment relation
In a finite game, Generally, there seems to be no relation between the convergence of Cournot paths and simultaneous Cournot paths (see Moulin, 1986 ). An exception is the case of two players, see Section 5 below.
A pseudo-Cournot path is a finite or infinite sequence 
Elimination of dominated strategies
The term "dominance solvability" is due to Moulin (1979) although the origins of the notion itself can be traced back to Luce and Raiffa (1957) . The elimination of strictly dominated strategies does not change, say, the set of Nash equilibria. The elimination of weakly dominated strategies is not at all innocuous (Samuelson, 1992) , but, nonetheless, is often regarded as legitimate.
Let Γ be a strategic game, i ∈ N , and x i , y i ∈ X i . We say that y i strictly dominates
Given a strategic game Γ, an elimination scheme of length m ≥ 0 is a collection of sequences X A game Γ is strictly/weakly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme such that, for each k ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}, every deleted strategy
Remark. A more usual requirement is that each player should become indifferent between all outcomes when the elimination process is completed; our perfect schemes do not ensure that. However, our weaker condition is sufficient for all "nice" conclusions.
An S-scheme is an elimination scheme of length m such that every
The idea of iterative elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies was implicit in Lemma 2 of Moulin (1984) , where it was shown to lead to the same result as the elimination of strictly dominated strategies (under rather strong assumptions, naturally). Generally, it can be viewed as an ordinal analogue of the rationalizability concept (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) . Admittedly, there is a serious difference between the two situations: If a pure strategy is not a best response to any probability distribution on the strategies of the other players, then it is dominated by a mixed strategy, hence the latter provides a justification for the elimination of the former. When only pure strategies are allowed, the fact that a strategy is not a best response to any profile of strategies of the partners does not make it inferior to any other strategy.
An ordinal version of rationalizability was developed by Borges (1993), but its departure from conventional notions of dominance was less radical than here. Actually, the question of which strategies are not needed by a player can only be resolved with a particular scenario (or a list of scenarios) in view; e.g., the Stackelberg solution of a two person game may well include the choice of a strictly dominated strategy by the leader. And it is easy to see that the elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies does not change the set of Nash equilibria.
Since BR-dominance solvability seems to have never been studied in the literature, we provide exact formulations and proofs of familiar properties in the new context. Three implications are obvious: a strictly (weakly) dominance solvable game is strongly (weakly) BR-dominance solvable with the same elimination scheme; an SBRDS game is WBRDS.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let k be the first step when
. On the other hand,
Proof. Straightforward induction based on the definition of a W-scheme shows
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we apply Lemma 3.2 to
Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 immediately imply that the set of Nash equilibria in a strongly BR-dominance solvable game is rectangular, and all perfect S-schemes eliminate the strategies not participating in the equilibria. As to perfect W-schemes, every such scheme can be extended until X m N becomes a singleton; however, which Nash equilibrium of the original game will be selected may depend on the particular elimination scheme. This dependence remains possible in the case of weak dominance solvability, but can be ruled out under reasonable assumptions (Gilboa et al., 1990; Marx and Swinkels, 1997) .
Implications of BR-dominance solvability
Given an elimination scheme of length m, we define µ i :
Then we define µ
Lemma 4.1. Let there be an S-scheme of length m and
Theorem 4.2. If a finite game Γ is SBRDS, then it has the FSBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme, we consider the functions µ and µ − defined by (2) and (3). Let us show that the strict ordering represented by µ − , i.e., Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme, we again consider the functions µ and µ − defined by (2) and (3). Let us show that the total preorder represented by µ − , i.e., (1b) 
Theorem 4.5. If a finite game is WBRDS, then it has the pseudo-FSBRP and pseudo-FBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect W-scheme, we consider the functions µ and µ − defined by (2) and (3). As above, if µ − (x N ) = m, then x N is already a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we pick
To prove the first statement, we notice that x N , y N is a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path. By Lemma 4.4, µ
. If y N is not a Nash equilibrium, we make a similar step, and so on. Thus we obtain a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path along which µ − strictly increases until a Nash equilibrium is reached. To prove the second statement, we pick i ∈ Argmin i∈N µ i (x i ). This time, x N , (y i , x −i ) is a pseudo-Cournot path; by Lemma 4.4, we have either µ 
for an i ∈ N . On the other hand, we have x 
Theorem 5.5. If a finite two person game is WBRDS, then it has the weak FSBRP and the weak FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 4.5 and Proposition 5.4.
Main necessity results
A very interesting feature of Moulin (1984) is an equivalence result (Corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2), even though obtained in a rather special case. From our current viewpoint, that result is just a fortunate coincidence: when all best responses are unique, both levels of BR-dominance solvability become equivalent. Generally, it seems impossible to derive strong BR-dominance solvability from any nice property of best response dynamics. There also seems to be no necessity result whatsoever for games with more than two players.
The Battle of Sexes, which has the FIP but is not even WBRDS, sets limits to necessity results. An obvious way around the example is to notice that it does not have even the weak FSBRP. Another, unexpectedly helpful, observation is that the set of Nash equilibria in the Battle of Sexes is not rectangular. 
Proof. Let i ∈ N and x
Since Γ has the weak FBRP, there is a Cournot path from (x i , x −i ) to a Nash equilibrium. Since 
The proof is the same as in Theorem 6.1. Exactly as in the same proof, the sequence Y k N (x N ) stabilizes at some stagem ∈ N. Since X N is finite, the samem will do for all Nash equilibria x N . 
. By the weak FSBRP and Claim 6.2.2, there is a Nash equilibrium
We pick a Nash equilibrium x N ∈ X N as in Claim 6.2.4 and finish the proof in exactly the same way as in Theorem 6.1.
Corollary. A finite two person game has the weak FSBRP if and only if it is WBRDS.
Remark. In the light of Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, there would be no point in distinguishing between the weak F(S)BRP and pseudo-F(S)BRP.
Intermediate BR-dominance
Although strong BR-dominance solvability does not follow from the FBRP or FSBRP, something stronger than weak BR-dominance solvability can be derived. Unfortunately, those intermediate versions are not sufficient for the FBRP or FSBRP, nor for any nicer properties of Cournot dynamics than those following from weak BR-dominance solvability. Let x i , y i ∈ X i ; we say that y i (strictly) BR-dominates x i in an intermediate sense,
An I-scheme (I!-scheme) is an elimination scheme of length m such that, for every k ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} and every Proof.
Claim 7.1.1. Either every strategy profile x N ∈ X N is a Nash equilibrium, or Γ contains a strategy BR-dominated in an intermediate sense.
Proof. Let the first statement not hold: there is, at least, one pair of strategy profiles such that y N sBR x N . Since there is no simultaneous Cournot cycle, we can pick an x * N ∈ X N which is not a Nash equilibrium and for which x * N sBR
is even strongly BR-dominated and we are home. Let X *
and we are home again; otherwise, there is x
N is assumed impossible, we must have 
Let us show that is acyclic. Supposing to the contrary that x Since X i is finite and is acyclic, there is y i ∈ X i such that y i x i does not hold for any
i (y i ) = ∅, then y i is even strongly BR-dominated, hence we are home immediately. For every
i.e., y i is strictly BR-dominated in an intermediate sense.
Now we apply Claim 7.2.1 in the same way as Claim 7.1.1 was applied in the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Unique best responses
The relationship between BR-dominance solvability and nice best response dynamics becomes especially simple in the case of two person games with unique best responses, as in Moulin (1984) . According to Propositions 8.1 and 8.3, there is then no need to distinguish between strong and weak versions of the properties. The set of Nash equilibria is rectangular if and only if it is a singleton. Proof. No more than one simultaneous Cournot path can be started from any x N . Therefore, if there were a simultaneous Cournot cycle, no equilibrium could be reached from any strategy profile belonging to the cycle. Similarly, no more than one Cournot path can be started from x N such that x i ∈ R i (x −i ) for at least one i ∈ N , and every Cournot cycle must consist of such profiles. 
"Counterexamples"
This section consists of examples showing the impossibility of easy extensions of our results. It should be noted that the preferences of the players in every game are "generic on outcomes," i.e., whenever a player is indifferent between two strategy profiles, each other player is indifferent too.
Example 9.1 shows that Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 become wrong if Γ is only weakly dominance solvable (or strictly BR-dominance solvable in an intermediate sense); Example 9.2 shows the same for Theorem 5.2. Example 9.1 simultaneously shows that Theorem 5.5 is wrong for more than two players.
Example 9.1. Let us consider a three person 2 × 3 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):
(3, 3, 3) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2) (3, 3, 3) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2) (0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1) .
Nash equilibria fill the left column of the left matrix; however, none of the underlined strategy profiles could be connected to any equilibrium with an individual improvement path or with a simultaneous Cournot path. Thus, the game does not have even the weak FIP or the weak FSBRP. On the other hand, it is weakly dominance solvable: The choice of the left matrix weakly dominates the choice of the right matrix; there is also strict BR-dominance in an intermediate sense. When the right matrix is deleted, the left column becomes strictly dominant.
Example 9.2. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0) (2, 2) (1, 0) (1, 0)
.
The bottom row and the left column are weakly dominant as well as strictly BR-dominant in an intermediate sense. The southwestern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. The underlined fragment is a Cournot cycle (hence a simultaneous Cournot cycle as well).
The Battle of Sexes has the FIP, but is not even weakly BR-dominance solvable; therefore, the converse to Theorems 4.3 and 5.2 is wrong. Example 9.3 shows that no general necessity result would be possible without the idea of BR-dominance solvability. Example 9.4 shows the impossibility to reverse Theorem 5.2 even when the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular. Example 9.5 shows the impossibility to reverse Theorem 4.2, or assert strict BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate sense in Theorem 7.1. Example 9.3. Let us consider the following bimatrix game: (0, 6) (4, 8) (8, 7) (1, 5) (5, 4) (7, 3) (2, 2) (3, 0) (6, 1)
. The southwestern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game has even the FIP as well as FSBRP; it is also SBRDS. However, there is no weakly dominated strategy.
Example 9.4. Let us consider a two person 2 × 2 game: (0, 2) (2, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) .
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game obviously has the FIP as well as FBRP. On the other hand, each strategy of each player is a best response to a strategy of the partner; therefore, the game is not SBRDS.
Example 9.5. Let us consider a two person 2 × 3 game:
(3, 2) (1, 3) (1, 3) (3, 2) (2, 1) (0, 0) .
There are two Nash equilibria: the northeastern and southwestern corners. The game has the FSBRP: the longest possible simultaneous Cournot path starts from the southeastern corner and then passes through all non-equilibrium strategy profiles. On the other hand, there is no BR-dominance of any kind between the strategies of player 1; among the strategies of player 2, there is only non-strict BR-dominance in an intermediate sense between the second and third columns. Therefore, the game is not SBRDS, nor even I!BRDS. (On the other hand, it is weakly dominance solvable) Example 9.6 shows that both Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 7.2 are wrong for more than two players; Example 9.7 shows the same for Theorems 6.2 and 7.1. Example 9.6. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):
(3, 4, 3) (0, 0, 0) (5, 5, 5) (4, 3, 4) (2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2) (0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 1) .
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; the FBRP is easy to check. On the other hand, each strategy of each player is the unique best response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not even WBRDS.
Example 9.7. Let us consider a three person 2 × 2 × 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3 matrices):
(2, 1, 2) (4, 4, 4) (0, 0, 0) (1, 3, 3) (0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 1) (4, 4, 4) (0, 0, 0) .
The two Nash equilibria are not underlined. Each of the three strategy profiles underlined once is dominated in the sense of sBR only by a Nash equilibrium; each of the three strategy profiles underlined twice is dominated in the same sense only by a strategy profile underlined once. Thus, the game has the FSBRP. On the other hand, each strategy of each player is a unique best response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not even WBRDS.
Example 9.8 shows that the adjectives "weak" in the corollary to Theorem 6.1 cannot be dropped.
Example 9.8. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(1, 3) (5, 2) (0, 0) (3, 1) (0, 0) (1, 3) (0, 0) (4, 4) (4, 4)
. The game has even the FIP; the southeastern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. In accordance with Theorem 7.2, it is WBRDS. However, it does not have the FSBRP: the profiles on the diagonal with utilities (0, 0) form a simultaneous Cournot cycle.
Example 9.9 shows that BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate sense cannot be asserted in Theorems 6.1 or 6.2. Example 9.10 shows that weak dominance solvability does not imply strict BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate sense (although implying the "non-strict" version of the property).
Example 9.9. Let us consider a two person 6 × 6 game defined by the left matrix: (3, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (1, 2) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) The northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The weak FSBRP is easy to check: the right matrix shows the length of the shortest simultaneous Cournot path leading to the equilibrium from every strategy profile. By Proposition 5.4, the game has the weak FBRP as well. On the other hand, none of the sets R −1 i (x i ) include each other for either i ∈ N , even if non-strict inclusion is taken into account. Therefore, no strategy is BR-dominated in an intermediate sense.
Example 9.10. Let us consider the following bimatrix game: (3, 3) (2, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) .
The middle column weakly dominates the right one; when the latter is deleted, the upper row becomes strictly dominant. Therefore, the game is weakly dominance solvable. On the other hand, none of the strategies is strictly BR-dominated in an intermediate sense: each row is the unique best response to a column; the left column is the unique best response to the upper row; both other columns are only best responses to the bottom row.
